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Abstract
Machine learning as a service has been widely deployed to
utilize deep neural network models to provide prediction ser-
vices. However, this raises privacy concerns since clients
need to send sensitive information to servers. In this pa-
per, we focus on the scenario where clients want to classify
private images with a convolutional neural network model
hosted in the server, while both parties keep their data pri-
vate. We present FALCON, a fast and secure approach for
CNN predictions based on Fourier Transform. Our solution
enables linear layers of a CNN model to be evaluated simply
and efficiently with fully homomorphic encryption. We also
introduce the first efficient and privacy-preserving protocol
for softmax function, which is an indispensable component
in CNNs and has not yet been evaluated in previous works
due to its high complexity. We implemented the FALCON
and evaluated the performance on real-world CNN models.
The experimental results show that FALCON outperforms
the best known works in both computation and communica-
tion cost.
1 Introduction
Deep learning has been applied to quite a few fields to over-
come the limitations of traditional data processing meth-
ods, such as image classification [22, 19], speech recognition
[3, 4], medical diagnosis [31, 12], etc. Some companies and
institutions have also invested in deep learning technologies,
and trained their own deep neural network models to provide
users with paid or free services. For example, Google Vision
[10] provides an API for image classification for develop-
ers and general users, and one can upload an image to the
cloud to obtain the classification result and its correspond-
ing probability. Although these services provide rich expe-
riences to users, they also cause serious privacy concerns
because uploaded user data may contain private informa-
tion [32], such as face pictures and X-ray images. Although
many companies claim that they will never leak or use users’
data for commercial purposes, the increasing number of user
data leaks alert us that there is no guarantee on what they
promised [2].
Certainly, the clients’ input data is not the only sensitive
information, because for servers, their own models also need
to be protected from adversarial clients. First, models may
be trained with large amount of private data, e.g., medical
records to obtain a model for disease prediction. Thus, sen-
sitive information could be extracted from a trained model if
disclosed to a malicious client [33, 34]. Second, model pa-
rameters and detailed prediction results, i.e., accurate prob-
abilities over all classes, can be used to generate adversar-
ial examples to deceive deep learning models [30, 9], to re-
sult in incorrect classification results. Third, many prediction
models themselves, even without considering sensitive train-
ing data, require intellectual property protection and cannot
be disclosed to third parties including their clients [23, 21].
With the continuous development of deep learning technol-
ogy, the privacy protection for user data and models has be-
come a key issue needed to be thoroughly addressed in ma-
chine learning as a service.
To tackle this problem, researchers have put forward a se-
cure deep learning scenario, where the server has a model,
the client has data, and these two interact in such a way
that the client can obtain the prediction result without leak-
ing anything to the server, while learning nothing about the
model. When we regard a deep neural network model as
a function, an intuitive idea for protecting privacy is to use
homomorphic encryption to evaluate it. A typical represen-
tative is the CryptoNets [16] proposed by Gilad-Bachrach
et al., who used leveled homomorphic encryption (LHE) [7]
to evaluate the entire neural network in the ciphertext do-
main. The limitations of CryptoNets are its heavy computa-
tion overhead and required modification of neural networks’
structure. Secure multi-party computing is another path for
secure function evaluation, and one of the representatives is
MiniONN [23] proposed by Liu et al., which transforms a
neural network model into an oblivious form and evaluates it
with secure two-party computation. Most recently, Juvekar
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et al. proposed GAZELLE [21], which used homomorphic
encryption and secure two-party computing to obtain better
performance.
In this paper, we focus on the fast and secure solution for
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs), one of the most im-
portant neural networks in deep learning. This kind of neural
network is characterized by the spatial input data, such as im-
ages and speeches. Typically, a deep neural network consists
of many layers, each of which has its specific functionality.
For a CNN model, it usually includes convolutional, activa-
tion, pooling, and fully-connected layers, and often follows
by a softmax layer. Convolutional and fully-connected layers
have linear property, while activation and pooling are nonlin-
ear layers. The softmax layer is used to normalize the output
of previous layers into the form of probability representation,
usually used in the last layer of a CNN to output a human-
friendly prediction result. The softmax layer is indispensable
in many use cases. For example, a CNN model classifies an
X-Ray image into “Pneumonia” with probability 5%. Al-
though “Pneumonia” is the top label, the real result actually
indicates that the patient has no such disease, and this can-
not be known without the probability output. Because the
softmax function involves division and exponentiation that
are very difficult to evaluate in a privacy-preserving way, the
existing works, e.g., CryptoNets, MiniONN and GAZELLE,
used argmax function instead of softmax to obtain only the
top one label. We, however, propose a novel efficient proto-
col for the softmax layer.
In FALCON, we utilize the linear property of fast Fourier
Transform (FFT) to design simple but efficient protocols for
linear layers, i.e., convolutional and fully-connected layers.
Our design enables the fully homomorphic encryption to be
used in linear layers in a straightforward way, thereby signifi-
cantly improving the evaluation performance. For non-linear
activation and pooling layers, we use Yao’s Garbled Circuits
[37] to implement secure computation. We provide detailed
evaluation methods for ReLU activation function and max
pooling function in FALCON. Those functions are chosen
for their popularity in CNN. For the privacy-preserving eval-
uation of softmax layer, which has not yet been addressed
by any previous work, we present an efficient and secure
two-party computation protocol, which is free of using ex-
pensive division and exponentiation computations in boolean
circuits.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We develop fast and secure protocols for convolutional
and fully connected layers. Our fast Fourier Transform
based design keeps the utilization of fully homomorphic
encryption simple but effective. We present FALCON
with the proposed protocols to realize an efficient and
privacy-preserving evaluation for convolutional neural
networks.
• We propose the first efficient secure two-party protocol
for the softmax function with high accuracy and low
computation complexity. The protocol can be used not
only in FALCON, but also in other neural networks with
the same security model.
• We implement FALCON, evaluate its performance, and
compare with prior works. Our results show that the pro-
posed scheme outperforms the best existing solutions on
real-word models.
2 Related Work
CryptoNets [16] scheme inspired us to process neural net-
work models securely with leveled homomorphic encryption
(LHE). It is non-interactive and allows a client to obtain a
result in one round of communication. Since only LHE is
used, CryptoNets only supports linear activation and pooling
functions, i.e. square activation and mean pooling. However,
in real-world scenarios, the square activation functions are
barely used for training or prediction. SecureML [25] pro-
posed efficient and privacy-preserving protocols for training
several kinds of machine learning models, including linear
regression, logistic regression and neural network, between
two non-colluding servers. It mainly used secure two-party
computation to train various models, and Paillier cryptosys-
tem was used to accelerate some calculations. SecureML is
the first to realize privacy preserving training on neural net-
works, which supports predictions naturally.
DeepSecure [28] used Yao’s Garbled Circuits only to en-
able scalable execution of deep neural network models in a
privacy-preserving setting. It focused on the scenario where
semi-trusted client and server interact with each other to
evaluate a trained model. Chameleon [27] comprehensively
used additively secret sharing [6], Yao’s Garbled Circuits
[37], and GMW protocol [17] to implement efficient secure
function evaluation, including CNN models.
MiniONN [23] transformed a neural network model into
an oblivious version, and used lattice-based additively homo-
morphic encryption to generate multiplication triplets first,
and then evaluated the model using secure two-party com-
putation efficiently. The more recent work GAZELLE [21]
utilized the lattice-based homomorphic encryption and de-
signed efficient schemes for privacy-preserving convolution
and matrix-vector multiplication operations. GAZELLE
used homomorphic cryptography in linear convolutional and
fully-connected layers, and secure two-party computation in
non-linear activation and pooling layers. Because MiniONN
and GAZELLE outperform all previous works, we only com-
pare FALCON with them to show our performance superior-
ity.
In all previous works, only the SecureML mentioned that
the softmax function can be evaluated with secure two-party
computation. But it provided no details and we will show
that the softmax max is too complex to implement with se-
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cure two-party computation directly. Other works used a
compromise way to deal with it, i.e., using argmax to replace
softmax function. However, often there are cases that clients
need to learn the probabilities of different output labels.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Convolutional Neural Network
A convolutional neural network (CNN) consists of four types
of layers, namely convolutional, activation, pooling, and
fully connected. An example CNN is shown in Fig. 1. The
first layer of a neural network takes the original data (e.g. an
X-Ray image) as the input, and each subsequent layer com-
putes a function over the previous output. A CNN processes
the input with a sequence of layers and outputs a result vec-
tor (called logits), which demonstrates the relative weights of
different potential classes. The class with the largest weight
is the target class. In most situations, we will use so f tmax
function to convert the logits to a probability vector, each
element of which shows the probability that the input is clas-
sified into a certain class. Below we describe the clean ab-
stractions of each layer.
Convolutional Layer (Conv). The input to a convolutional
layer is a w× h× c image where w and h are the width and
height of the image and c is the number of channels, e.g.
an RGB image has c = 3. The convolutional layer has k
filters (or kernels) of size fw × fh × c. In a convolutional
layer, an input image is convolved in turn with k filters, and
thus producing k output images. To better understand this
operation, we consider a fw× fh× c filter convolves with a
w× h× c image. As shown in Fig. 2, for each one of c
images of size w× h, a corresponding filter among c filters
of size fw× fh convolves with it, producing c intermediate
images. The final output is the result of summing up these
images. Denoting the input images as xi, i ∈ [1,c], the filters
as wi, j, i ∈ [1,c], j ∈ [1,k], and the output images as y j, j ∈
[1,k], we can express the above computation as follows:
y j =
c
∑
i=1
xi ∗wi, j, (1)
where “∗” is convolution operation.
Activation Layer. Neural networks use non-linear acti-
vation functions to improve non-linearity of models. Since
ReLU (rectified linear unit) [26] is the default activation
function and has the best performance in popular CNNs [18],
we use it in our FALCON. The ReLU function is shown as
follows:
f (x) = max(0,x) . (2)
The output of a ReLU activation layer has the same shape as
the input, which means f (x) is applied to each pixel in the
input images.
Pooling Layer. Pooling functions reduce the dimension-
ality of the input by calculating the mean or the maximum
value. A pooling layer will partition the input into a set of
non-overlapping rectangle sub-areas and perform the mean
or the maximum function on each sub-area. These two types
of functions correspond to mean pooling and max pooling,
respectively.
Fully Connected Layer (FC). The input to a fully con-
nected layer is a vector vi of length li, and after multiplying
with a weight matrix W of size lo× li, it outputs a vector vo
of length no, shown as follows:
vo =Wvi+b, (3)
where b is a bias vector of length lo and can be discarded
in some networks. Note that the original input is a group of
images, so we need to flatten them before feeding to a fully
connected layer.
Softmax Function. In general, the output of a CNN is
called logits, which shows the scores of different classes for
an input. In image classification scenarios, a softmax layer
will be used as the last layer to convert the logits to the prob-
abilities using
f (x)k =
exi
∑Kk=1 exk
, for i= 1,2, · · · ,K, (4)
where K is the number of classes as well as the length of
logits, and we can find that ∑Kk=1 f (x)k = 1. In most sce-
narios, we only need the classification result t, where t =
argmax(logits), and the corresponding probability f (x)t . In
all previous work, such as MiniONN and GAZELLE, clients
can only obtain t, while in our FALCON design, f (x)t is also
available to clients.
3.2 Fast Fourier Transform
In image processing, the well-known fast Fourier Transform
(FFT) is an algorithm that can convert an image from its
space domain to a representation in the frequency domain
and vice versa [36]. Letting f (x,y) denote the pixel value of
a M×N image at point (x,y), we can compute the FFT of
the image as follows:
F f (u,v) =
M−1
∑
x=0
N−1
∑
y=0
f (x,y) · e− j2pi( uxM+ vyN ), (5)
where u∈ [0,M−1],v∈ [0,N−1], andF f (u,v) is a complex
number. From the formula we can see that the representa-
tions of an image in different domains have the same shape.
For simplicity, we denote the FFT of input x as F (x). An
important property of the FFT used in this paper is linearity,
i.e. for two inputs x and y, we have the following equation:
F (x)+F (y) =F (x+y). (6)
3
hf
…
w
h
Conv Layer
0
Activation Layer Pooling Layer
flatten 
FC Layer
il
0l
logits
Softmax
Softmax Layer
c
wf
k
Pneumonia 0.61
Cardiopathy   0.15
…
ReLU
Figure 1: An example of convolutional neural networks.
… …
SUM*
Figure 2: Convolution operation.
To reduce the number of required operations when evalu-
ating convolutional layers, we use the Convolution Theorem:
the convolutions in the space domain are equivalent to point-
wise products in the frequency domain. Denoting F−1 as
the inverse FFT, the convolutions between inputs x and y can
be computed as follows:
x∗y=F−1(F (x) ·F (y)). (7)
This transformation can be used to accelerate training and
prediction of CNN models. The basic idea is to convert the
input and filters of a convolutional layer to the frequency do-
main, and then perform the pointwise product instead of the
convolution. In this paper, we use the similar idea to speed
up the convolution operation in the ciphertext domain, and
we will show that FFT operations have little effect on the
performance of a CNN model.
3.3 Cryptographic Building Blocks
3.3.1 Lattice-based Homomorphic Encryption.
To implement privacy-preserving convolutions in FALCON,
we require two kinds of homomorphic operations: SIM-
DAdd and SIMDMul. The SIMD here means we can pack
a vector of plaintext elements into a ciphertext, and perform
calculations on ciphertexts corresponding to each plaintext
element, which reduces required ciphertext size and eval-
uation time. The SIMDAdd represents homomorphic ad-
dition between two ciphertexts, while the SIMDMul rep-
resents homomorphic multiplication between a ciphertext
and a plaintext. All these requirements can be satisfied
by modern lattice-based homomorphic encryption systems
[15, 13, 8]. There are three required parameters in these
schemes, namely number of plaintext slots n, plaintext mod-
ule p, and ciphertext module q. Parameter n is the maximum
number of data that can be processed in SIMD style. Param-
eter p limits the range of plaintext data. Parameter q can be
calculated from given n and p. In this paper, we denote the
ciphertext of x as [x].
3.3.2 Secure Two-Party Computation.
Secure two-party computation protocols allow two parties
to jointly evaluate functions on each other’s private data
while preserving their privacy. Functions are represented
as boolean circuits and then computed by these protocols.
Yao’s Garbled Circuits is a representative implementation of
such protocols and will be used in this paper for the secure
computation between a client and a server.
The ABY framework [11] is an open source library that
supports secure two-party computation, and we use this li-
brary to implement secure ReLU, max pooling and softmax
layer. This library has encapsulated several basic operations
for secure computation, and we here introduce the operations
used in this paper (Note that, the term “share’ used in what
follows means Yao sharing, which is a type of sharing used
by Yao’s Garbled Circuits.):
– ADDGate(a, b) performs an arithmetic addition on input
shares a and b, and returns the result as a share.
– SUBGate(a, b) performs an arithmetic subtraction on in-
put shares a and b, and returns the result as a share.
– GTGate(a, b) performs a ternary operation “a> b ? 1 : 0”,
and returns 1 if a> b, 0 otherwise.
– MUXGate(a, b, s) performs as a multiplexer, and returns a
if s is 1, returns b if s is 0.
Since the ABY supports SIMD technique, all these opera-
tions can receive arrays as inputs, and process them in SIMD
style, which can reduce the memory footprint and evaluation
time of circuits.
4
Table 1: Privacy guarantees in related works.
input content input size model weights type of layer layer size number of layers filter size
FALCON 3 5 3 partial 5 5 3
GAZELLE [21] 3 5 3 partial 5 5 3
MiniONN [23] 3 5 3 5 5 5 5
SecureML [25] 3 5 3 5 5 5 5
DeepSecure [28] 3 5 3 5 5 5 5
“3” means the scheme hides the corresponding information.
“5” means the scheme leaks the corresponding information.
“partial” means the scheme can hide the information on which layers are convolutional layers and which are fully connected.
4 FALCON Execution Flow
Consider such a scenario that a doctor wants to learn the po-
tential disease a patient might have from an X-Ray image,
only knowing the top label without the corresponding proba-
bility may lead to unreliable diagnostic result. For example,
the output top label “Pneumonia” with probability “0.9” and
“0.1” definitely have different meanings for treatment. In
this section, we will outline the execution flow of FALCON.
We consider a typical convolutional neural network as shown
in Fig.1, which contains common neural network layers. The
basic idea of FALCON is to use homomorphic encryption
and Yao’s Garbled Circuits to allow private neural network
evaluation between two parties.
System model. We consider a client C who wants to predict
an input (e.g. an X-Ray image) with a convolutional neural
network model held by a server S. For client C, the input
is private. For server S, the parameters of convolutional and
fully connected layers are also private. Our design goal is to
preserve privacy for both parties when evaluating CNN mod-
els. We assume that both C and S are semi−honest. That is,
they adhere to the execution flow defined by FALCON pro-
tocols, while trying to learn the other party’s private infor-
mation as much as possible.
Privacy guarantees. For server S, FALCON protects the
following information about the model: all the weight pa-
rameters of convolutional and fully-connected layers, and
the filter size of convolutional layers. FALCON does not
hide the model architecture, i.e., the type of layer, layer size
(the number of neurons in a layer), and the number of layers.
For client C, FALCON leaks no information about the input
content but does not protect the input size. We show the com-
parison for privacy guarantees with related works in Table 1,
where all schemes use two semi-honest parties. We can see
that FALCON preserves as much privacy as GAZELLE and
outperforms other works in privacy preserving.
At the beginning, C holds an input vector x and the private
key, and S holds the neural network model. To evaluate the
first layer, which is mostly a convolutional layer, C encrypts
the FFT of x, denoted by [F (x)], and transfers it to S. Then,
S and C together do the following:
1. (Evaluate the Conv layer) S feeds the convolutional
layer with [F (x)] and obtains the output [F (y)], where
y is the plaintext output. In order to compute the next ac-
tivation layer, S and C will each hold an additive share of
y. To this end, S uses a random vector r to mask the ci-
phertext to obtain [F (y-r)] and sends it to C. The client
C decrypts it and performs the inverse FFT to obtain y-r.
The client C sets its share xC = y-r and the server S sets
its share xS = r. At this time, S and C additively share
the output value y, which is also the input to the next
layer. (See details in Section 5.2.)
2. (Evaluate the ReLU layer) For the ReLU layer, S and
C can run the boolean circuits designed for the ReLU
function using Yao’s Garbled Circuits. Note that, we
still require that the output value is additively shared by
two parties. (See details in Section 5.3.2.)
3. (Evaluate the pooling layer) Evaluating the mean pool-
ing function on two additive shares is simple. We can
have these two parties perform mean pooling on their
shares respectively. For max pooling, we also design
boolean circuits to realize it. Note that, the same as
ReLU, we need to ensure that S and C additively share
the output value. (See details in Section 5.3.3.)
4. (Evaluate the FC layer) Typically, the fully connected
layer operation is treated as the matrix multiplication.
In our design, we convert this layer into a convolutional
layer while preserving the correctness of output values.
Then we can use the same method in the convolutional
layer to evaluate this layer. Note that the input to this
layer is additively shared by S and C, so we need to
translate from shares to ciphertexts. To this end, letting
the shares of S and C be respectively xS and xC, C en-
crypts the FFT of its share and sends it to S. Then S
adds the FFT of its share to obtain [F (xC+xS)], which
is the input form of a convolutional layer. (See details in
Section 5.4.)
5. (Evaluate the softmax layer) The input to softmax
function is generally the output of a fully-connected
layer. In our design, we first have S and C additively
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share the input. Then we disassemble the softmax func-
tion into a max and an inner product function to enable
the client C to obtain the target class with probability
efficiently. (See details in Section 5.5.)
5 FALCON Design
In this section, we present privacy-preserving protocols for
each layer according to the order.
5.1 Setup
Before moving on to the implementation details of each
layer, we first introduce the encryption method and the trans-
lation between a ciphertext and additive shares. At the be-
ginning, the client C holds the input x and needs to transfer
its ciphertext to the server S. In our design, all ciphertexts
correspond to plaintext data in the frequency domain. That
is, for input x of size w× h, the client C first performs the
FFT according to Eq. 5 to obtain F (x), and then encrypts
it. The F (x) inherits the size of x, but every element of it
is a complex number, e.g. F (x)0,0 = a+ b j where a and
b are real numbers. Note that we cannot apply homomor-
phic encryption directly to complex numbers. Thus, we let
the client C encrypt the real parts (e.g., a) and the imagi-
nary parts (e.g., b) into two ciphertexts respectively. That is,
for every element in F (x), C packs all the real parts into a
plaintext vector and encrypts this vector, which is denoted
as [F (x)R]. Accordingly, the ciphertext of all the imaginary
parts is denoted as [F (x)I ]. All the ciphertexts involved in
the FALCON have this form.
The output of a linear layer, i.e., convolutional and fully
connected layer, is a ciphertext, while the input to a non-
linear layer is additive shares. Therefore, before feeding
the output of a linear layer into a non-linear layer, we need
to translate from a ciphertext to additive shares. Assume
that the output of a linear layer is [F (y)], which is actu-
ally [F (y)R] and [F (y)I ], the aim of server S and client C
is to respectively obtain xS and xC, satisfying xS+ xC = y,
and guaranteeing no information about y will be exposed
to either S or C. In order to achieve this goal, S generates
a random vector r of the same size to y, and performs the
FFT to obtain F (r)R and F (r)I . Using the SIMDAdd, S
adds these values to the ciphertext homomorphically to ob-
tain [F (y)R−F (r)R] and [F (y)I −F (r)I ]. Recall the lin-
earity of the FFT shown in Eq. 6, we have
[F (y)R−F (r)R] = [F (y− r)R]
and
[F (y)I−F (r)I ] = [F (y− r)I ].
The client C decrypts them and combines the imaginary parts
with the real parts to obtainF (y−r), and then performs the
inverse FFT to get (y− r). Letting xS = r and xC = (y− r),
we have the y be additively shared.
To translate from additive shares to a ciphertext, namely
feed the output of a non-linear layer to a linear layer, we can
run the reverse of the above process. Assume that C holds
(y− r) and S holds r, the client C encrypts the FFT of its
share and sends the ciphertext to S; the server S homomor-
phically adds the FFT of its share to obtain [F (y)].
Note that FALCON works in Zp, where p is the selected
plaintext module for lattice-based homomorphic encryption,
while the original neural networks need to perform floating-
point calculations on decimal numbers. We use a simple so-
lution which has been used in previous works to handle this
issue, i.e. treating decimal numbers as integers by proper
scaling and dropping the fractional parts. This way of deal-
ing with decimal numbers only leads to a negligible loss of
accuracy, which will be shown in Section 6. For any interme-
diate value xm, xm < bp/2c implies xm is positive, otherwise
negative.
5.2 Secure Convolutional Layer
Recall that the input to a convolutional layer is the ciphertext
of x of size w×h×c. In our setting, there are two ciphertexts,
namely [F (x)R] and [F (x)I ], and both have size w×h× c.
Also, the selected n, i.e. the number of plaintext slots, satis-
fied n > w× h. The server S has access to k plaintext filters
and needs to compute the convolution results of the input and
these filters. Without FFT, previous works transform the con-
volution operations to matrix multiplications first, and then
calculate it on the ciphertext domain. But the computational
complexity of this approach is too high, because the number
of additions and multiplications it takes grows with the size
of the input and filters. Even if uses SIMD fashion, it still in-
volves many heavy permutation operations in the ciphertext
domain [21]. In FALCON, by utilizing the FFT, we reduce
the computational complexity, where the server S only needs
to perform SIMD homomorphic additions (SIMDAdd) and
scalar multiplications (SIMDMul). In particular, the number
of SIMDAdd and SIMDMul is respectively fixed to 2 and 4
for a given input image.
At a high level, client C and server S transform their raw
data, i.e. the input and the filters, into the frequency domain
with the FFT, and then S evaluates the convolutional layer
in the frequency domain with homomorphic encryption. In
this part, we first introduce a simple case where the input
has single channel (c = 1) and the layer has only one filter
(k = 1) to present our key idea. Then we describe a more
general case where c> 1 and k > 1.
5.2.1 Simple Case.
In this case, the inputs are two ciphertexts, namely [F (x)R]
and [F (x)I ], both plaintexts of which have size w×h. To ap-
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Figure 3: The convolution operations for multiple channels in plaintext.
ply the convolution operation on frequency domain, server S
performs the FFT on the filter of size fw× fh to obtain the
result of size w× h. Recall that the output of the FFT has
the same shape with the input, and thus S first pads the filters
with zeros until its size reaches w×h, and then performs the
FFT. Letting fi denote the filter, we can get the FFT results
of the filter as F (fi)R and F (fi)I . Note that, the number of
plaintext slots is large enough to encode w×h elements into
one plaintext vector, i.e. w× h < n. According to the Con-
volution Theorem (7), the pointwise product of F (x) and
F (fi) corresponds to the convolution of x and fi. Assume
that the convolution result is y and the corresponding fre-
quency domain values areF (y)R andF (y)I , we have
[F (y)R] = [F (x)R]⊗F (fi)R ⊕ [F (x)I ]⊗ (−F (fi)I),
[F (y)I ] = [F (x)R]⊗F (fi)I ⊕ [F (x)I ]⊗F (fi)R,
where “⊗” represents SIMDMul, and “⊕” represents SIM-
DAdd. The server S then generates a random vector r of
size w× h, and encrypts its FFT values as [−F (r)R] and
[−F (r)I ]. Finally, S sends the following two ciphertexts to
C:
[F (y− r)R] = [F (y)R]⊕ [−F (r)R],
[F (y− r)I ] = [F (y)I ]⊕ [−F (r)I ].
The client C decrypts the ciphertexts, combines the real
parts with the imaginary parts, and performs the inverse FFT
to obtain (y− r), which is set to C’s share xC. Then, server
S sets r to its share xS. At this point, the convolutional layer
has been evaluated, and the result y is additively shared by S
and C.
5.2.2 General Case.
In the convolutional layer, all k filters are independently con-
volved with the input to get k outputs, as shown in Fig. 2.
Thus, we take the convolution implementation for a filter of
size fw× fh× c and an input of size w× h× c as an exam-
ple. In order to present our idea clearly, we first explain how
to calculate the convolution in the plaintext domain for the
filter fi (i ∈ [1,k]) that contains c channels fi1, fi2, · · · , fic, and
the input x that contains c channels x1,x2, · · · ,xc. As shown
in Fig. 3, c × 2-D filters and c × 2-D inputs are first trans-
formed using the FFT, and then the corresponding channels
are multiplied to get c intermediate results. Finally, these in-
termediate results are added to obtain the final output in the
frequency domain.
According to the plaintext calculation process, we can
think of a straightforward calculation process for the cipher-
text. That is, consider these 2-D filters and inputs as c in-
dependent groups, and apply the calculation process in the
above simple case to them to get c intermediate ciphertexts.
Adding these ciphertexts together, we can obtain the final ci-
phertext result. However, this method wastes many plaintext
slots since w×h< n, and sometimes even w×h<< n. Also,
client C has to transfer c ciphertexts to server S, which takes
up more bandwidth.
In order to make full use of the plaintext slots, a heuristic
approach is to pack as much data as possible into a plaintext
vector, and thus there will be 2 · d(w×h× c)/ne ciphertexts,
where “2” is due to the fact that the real parts and the imag-
inary parts are packed separately. A follow-up question is
that we need to add the intermediate results inside ciphertexts
due to our packing. This can be done by using homomorphic
permutation, which has a high computation overhead. Fortu-
nately, in our design, we let server S return the intermediate
ciphertexts after masking with random vector r to client C ,
who decrypts these ciphertexts and adds them in the plaintext
domain. After that, S and C set their xS and xC respectively
to additively share the output y.
5.2.3 Security analysis.
The input data of client C, weight parameters, and the size
of filters require protection in FALCON. Since the input data
remain encrypted during the evaluation of server S, the data
are protected. Client C only obtains the masked convolu-
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tional result, and thus learns nothing about the weight pa-
rameters. Because filters are padded into the same size with
the input, their size is also preserved.
5.3 Secure Activation Layer & Pooling Layer
We next describe the implementation for activation and pool-
ing layers together, and we will introduce a method to accel-
erate these two layers by adjusting the processing pipeline to
reduce the number of required operations. To be noted, al-
though using secure two-party computation to securely eval-
uate non-linear layers has been proposed and used in pre-
vious works, e.g., GAZELLE, there lacks implementation
details. We implement the boolean circuits for non-linear
layers with one of the most advanced secure two-party com-
putation library, ABY framework. In what follows, we first
introduce the data preprocessing phase, which translates the
additive shares of C and S to Yao sharing, and is used in ABY
framework [11] for Yao’s Garbled Circuits. The data pre-
processing also guarantees that the Yao sharing ranges from
[0, p). Then we present the boolean circuits for the ReLU
and max pooling functions. This boolean circuits ever was
used in GAZELLE and we present it here for the complete-
ness of the paper. Also, since the ciphertext is decrypted by
the client which may reveal information about the server’s
input, we should also guarantee the circuit privacy. This has
been addressed in GAZELLE and we thus omit the details
here. The optimized solution for these two layers is given in
what follows. Finally, we describe the method to translate
Yao sharing back to additive shares. Before introduing the
technical details, we declare that the data preprocessing only
happens when shifting from convolutional layers to activa-
tion or pooling layers. That is, for consecutive activation or
pooling layers, the data prepocessing will be performed only
once.
5.3.1 Data preprocessing.
Assume that xC = {xC1 ,xC2 , · · · ,xCN} and xS = {xS1,xS2, · · · ,xSN}
are the additive shares held by client C and server S, respec-
tively. Since both xCi and x
S
i belong to [0, p), we have x
C
i +x
S
i
belongs to [0,2p). Because our plaintext module is set to
p, we need to limit the sum of the two input shares to the
range of 0 to p. This is achieved by using ABY framework
to implement the boolean circuits, as shown in Listing 1.
The first ADDGate receives two inputs xC and xS and out-
puts the sum of them. The second GTGate judges if the sum
exceeds p, and the result is sent to the MUXGate, which is
a multiplexer that decides whether to subtract p or not. The
subtraction is done by the SUBGate. These circuits guar-
antee that the output is
(
xC+ xS
)
mod p. Note that all the
operations on the shares are in SIMD programming style,
which is supported by the ABY framework, thereby reduc-
ing the overhead greatly. In Listing 1, all the yshr variables
ADD
SUB
GT
MUX
x_C
x_S
p
Figure 4: Boolean circuits for data preprocessing.
/*data preprocessing, returns (x_C+x_S)%p in
Yao Sharing*/
yshr DataPreprocessing(yshr x_C, yshr x_S,
yshr p){
yshr x, gt, dif, res;
x = ADDGate(x_C, x_S);
gt = GTGate(x, p);
dif = SUBGate(x, p);
res = MUXGate(x, dif, gt);
return res;
}
Listing 1: Function description of data preprocessing.
are vectors of length N, which equals to the number of input
elements.
Performance. As reported in ABY paper [11], the com-
putation and the communication costs of ADDGate, SUB-
Gate, GTGate and MUXGate are almost the same when us-
ing Yao sharing. Thus, we denote the cost of one operation
by SIMD(N) , where N is the number of values in one share,
and the total cost of data preprocessing is 4 ·SIMD(N).
/*
ReLU, returns max(x, 0);
x is the output of DataPreprocessing();
p_2 is p/2.
*/
yshr ReLU(yshr x, yshr p_2){
yshr gt, res;
gt = GTGate(x, p_2);
res = MUXGate(x, 0, gt);
return res;
}
Listing 2: Function description of ReLU.
5.3.2 Secure ReLU layer.
Typically, a convolutional layer and a non-last fully con-
nected layer are followed by a ReLU activation layer, which
decides whether an input value should be continued to pass
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down, or in other words, whether the neuron is activated by
the input value, as shown in Fig. 5. Recall that the ReLU
function is f (x) = max(x,0), and in our setting, the in-
put x = {x1,x2, · · · ,xN} is additively shared by client C and
server S, i.e. xC+ xS = x. Our aim is to enable that C and
S additively share max(x,0). That is, C holds max(x,0)− r
while S holds r, where r is randomly generated by S. Min-
iONN considers max(x,0) = x · compare(x,0), and imple-
ments the ReLU function by GTGate and MULGate (Multi-
plication Gate) provided by ABY. Due to the relatively high
overhead of MULGate, the MULGate is replaced by MUX-
Gate, which has a much less overhead as stated in ABY pa-
per. The pseudocode is shown in Listing 2.
Recall that, for a given x, x > p/2 implies x is negative,
and positive otherwise. The first GTGate performs a great-
than operation (>), and the output is used by the MUXGate
to select the positive x or 0 as the result.
Performance. The total cost is 2 ·SIMD(N).
5.3.3 Secure pooling layer.
The pooling layer performs down-sampling by dividing the
input into rectangular pooling regions and computing the
mean or maximum of each region, which reduces the spa-
tial dimensions, as shown in Fig. 5. To evaluate the mean
pooling, we can simply let client C and server S compute the
mean value of their respective shares of each region. Our
focus is the evaluation of max pooling function which is im-
plemented in Yao’s Garbled Circuits provided by the ABY
framework. Assume that the rectangle pooling region has
size k, and the number of regions is approximate N/k, which
is also the output size. For example, N = 16, k = 2× 2 = 4
and N/k = 4 in Fig. 5. Letting xregion = {x1,x2, · · · ,xk}
be one of the rectangular pooling regions, our aim is to cal-
culate max(x1,x2, · · · ,xk). The pseudocode of the designed
boolean circuits is shown in Listing 3.
Since the input has been limited from 0 to p/2 by the
ReLU layer, we can iteratively compare two elements to ob-
tain the max element with GT and MUX circuits without con-
sidering the existence of negative elements. Because com-
parisons are performed inside each region, we pack N ele-
ments into k vectors of size N/k through SubsetGate.
Performance. The total cost is 1 · SubsetGate+(k− 1) ·
SIMD(N/k).
5.3.4 The Optimized ReLU and max pooling layers.
Recall that in a typical processing pipeline, a ReLU layer is
followed by a max pooling layer, and the basic operation of
both is max(). Assume that xregion = {x1,x2, · · · ,xk} is one
of the rectangle pooling regions but has not applied to the
ReLU function. Then, the final output of the max pooling
-5 5 6 -3
3 12 -7 7
-2 -7 -3 -9
9 -6 -1 -6
ReLU
0 5 6 0
3 12 0 7
0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0
12 7
9 0
Max Pooling
-5 5 6 -3
3 12 -7 7
-2 -7 -3 -9
9 -6 -1 -6
12 7
9 -1
Max Pooling 12 7
9 0
ReLU
Original:
Ours:
Figure 5: Original ReLU and Max Pooling v.s. Our Max
Pooling and ReLU.
/*
MaxPooling, returns max(x1,x2,...,xk);
x is the output of ReLU();
p_2 is p/2; k is the region size.
*/
yshr MaxPooling(yshr x, yshr p_2, int k){
yshr x_reg[k], gt, res;
// split the x into k pieces.
x_reg = SubsetGate(x);
res = x_reg[0];
for (int i = 1; i < k; i++) {
gt = GTGate(res, x_reg[i]);
res = MUXGate(res, reg[i], gt);
}
return res;
}
Listing 3: Function description of max pooling.
layer should be
max(max(x1,0) ,max(x2,0) , · · · ,max(xk,0)) ,
where the inside max() corresponds to the ReLU function
while the outside is the max pooling function.We can find
that this process is equivalent to the following one:
max(max(x1,x2, · · · ,xk) ,0) ,
where the inside max() can be considered as the max pooling
function while the outside as the ReLU function. Based on
this observation, reversing the position of the ReLU layer
and the max pooling layer in the processing pipeline will
reduce the number of max() operations. An example is
shown in Fig. 5. In fact, this trick has been proposed in
the study of deep learning [1]. Nevertheless, due to the
fact that the ReLU and max pooling functions are relatively
much cheaper than the heavy convolutional and fully con-
nected layers in the plaintext domain, this optimization has
been discarded. However, in the ciphertext domain, all these
9
1 /*
2 Optimized MaxPooling and ReLU;
3 x is the output of DataPreprocessing();
4 p_2 is p/2; k is the region size.
5 */
6 yshr OptMaxPoolingAndReLU(yshr x, yshr p, yshr
p_2, int k){
7 yshr x_reg[k], gt, res;
8
9 // Firstly, perform max pooling.
10 x_reg = SubsetGate(x);
11 res = x_reg[0];
12 for (int i = 1; i < k; i++) {
13 gt = GTGate(res, x_reg[i]);
14 res = MUXGate(res, reg[i], gt);
15 }
16
17 //Secondly, perform ReLU.
18 gt = GTGate(res, p_2);
19 res = MUXGate(res, 0, gt);
20
21 return res;
22 }
Listing 4: Function description of our max pooling and
ReLU.
functions have great impacts on the overall performance. We
report and utilize this optimization here to further improve
the FALCON performance. With this approach, we can see
that the number of max() operations in the max pooling layer
does not change, but the ReLU layer is reduced greatly. For
a max pooling layer with (2× 2) region with a stride of 2,
our method can save 75% of the ReLU operations.
The pseudocode is shown in Listing 4. We first apply max
pooling operations to obtain max values of each region, and
ReLU operations follow to filter out all negative values.
Performance. The total cost is 1 · SubsetGate + (k −
1) · SIMD(N/k)+ 2 · SIMD(N/k) = 1 · SubsetGate+(k+ 1) ·
SIMD(N/k). If we use the original implementation of ReLU
and Max pooling operations, the cost would be 2 ·SIMD(N)+
1 ·SubsetGate+(k−1) ·SIMD(N/k). Thus, our acceleration
approach can reduce by 2 ·SIMD(N)−2 ·SIMD(N/k).
5.3.5 Output circuits for ReLU and Max Pooling
The original outputs of the ReLU or the max pooling circuits
are in the form of Yao sharing. Our aim is to additively share
the result between client C and server S. This can be achieved
by taking the output y and a random vector (−r mod p) gen-
erated by S as two inputs of the data preprocessing circuit,
and the result of which is (y− r mod p) and is sent to C.
5.3.6 Security analysis.
Since ReLU and max pooling layers do not have private
model parameters, we only focus on the confidentiality of
the input. Due to the security of Yao’s Garbled Circuits, the
input data are hidden.
5.4 Secure Fully Connected Layer
Normally, the fully connected layer can be treated as the mul-
tiplication of a weight matrix and an input vector, and this
can be executed very fast in the plaintext domain. However,
in the ciphertext domain, especially using SIMD techniques
in homomorphic encryption, this kind of multiplication is
expensive. Inspired by the observation that fully connected
layer can be viewed as convolutional layers with filters that
cover the entire input regions [24], we propose an efficient
solution by transforming the FC layer to the convolutional
layer first, and then utilizing the acceleration method in Sec-
tion 5.2 to evaluate the fully-connected layer.
We here briefly describe how to transform a fully con-
nected layer into a convolutional layer. Recall that a fully
connected layer first flattens the input of size w× h× c to a
vector of size li, where li = w× h× c, and then multiplies
it with a matrix of size l0× li to obtain the output vector of
size l0. For such a fully connected layer, we can transform
it to a convolutional layer with l0 filters, each of which has
size w×h×c, i.e. fw = w and fh = h, and remove the flatten
operation. The size of the output will be 1× 1× l0, which
can be viewed as a vector of length l0.
The next steps are straightforward. We can use the pro-
posed secure convolution method introduced in Section 5.2
to evaluate the transformed fully connected layer. Note that,
for classification CNNs, the last layer is always a fully con-
nected layer, the output of which is treated as a weight vec-
tor, also known as logits. Each value in this vector represents
the weight of the corresponding label in the classification re-
sult. Therefore, C can run an oblivious argmax using Yao’s
Gabled Circuits with S to obtain the result.
Security analysis. The fully-connected layer is evaluated
exactly as a convolutional layer, and thus the weight param-
eters are also protected and the the client cannot tell the dif-
ference between a covolutional and a fully connected layer.
5.5 Secure Softmax Layer
In all the classification CNNs, the last fully connected layer
is always followed by a softmax layer to generate the prob-
ability distribution over K different possible classes. How-
ever, to our best knowledge, in all previous work, the authors
presented that the server can return the logits to the client,
who could obtain the probabilities by performing softmax
function locally, e.g. GAZELLE, or the client runs argmax
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using secure two-party computation to only obtain the classi-
fication result without knowing logits and probabilities, e.g.
MiniONN. There are two main reasons why these schemes
bypass the encrypted computation of softmax layer:
1. Implementing the softmax function would bring very
high computation complexity, no matter using homo-
morphic encryption or secure two-party protocols.
2. The papers did not realize that revealing the logits or
probabilities of all classes may reveal a lot of data of the
model.
The heavy computation complexity is due to the division and
exponentiation operations in the softmax function when us-
ing homomorphic encryption or secure two-party computa-
tion, and we thus propose a division and exponentiation free
protocol to avoid performing these operations with secure
two-party computation. We notice that in a client-server sce-
nario, by only accessing prediction results, C is able to ex-
tract an equivalent or near-equivalent model [35], infer the
training set [33, 29], and generate adversarial examples [9].
To tackle this issue, S can only return the necessary result,
i.e. the class to which the input belongs and its correspond-
ing probability, to C. In MiniONN, the target class will be
returned without probability. While in FALCON, the prob-
ability can also be obtained by C with our secure softmax
protocol.
Recall that the softmax function is given by
f (x)i =
exi
∑Kk=1 exk
, for i= 1,2, · · · ,K,
where f (x)i is the probability that the input belongs to the
class i. Letting the target class be t, our aim is to calculate
pt = e
xt
∑Kk=1 e
xk
. For the numerator, we have the client C calcu-
late argmax and max functions with the server S using Yao’s
Garbled Circuits to learn t and share xt . For the denomina-
tor, we let S and C multiplicatively share ex, thus translating
highly complex calculations into simple vector inner prod-
uct. Furthermore, we ignore some items in ex to improve the
performance while guaranteeing the accuracy of pt , and we
will prove its correctness.
Before moving to the detailed protocols, we first give the
following theorem:
Theorem 1. For pt = e
xt
∑Kk=1 e
xk
, where xt = max(x1, · · · ,
xK), and p′t = e
xt
∑
xk≥xt−m
exk , where m ≥ ln
[
(10l−1)(K−1)]
and l ≥ 1, we have |pt − p′t | ≤ 10−l .
The proof of correctness can be found in the appendix A.
This theorem shows that in the case of an accuracy require-
ment of 10−l , we can replace pt with p′t . In another word,
we can set a threshold xt−m, and all the values less than the
threshold will be ignored during the calculation, which can
significantly reduce the computational complexity. Further-
more, we can transform p′t as follows
p′t =
ext
∑
xk≥xt−m
exk
=
ext/ext−m
∑
xk≥xt−m
exk/ext−m
=
em
∑
xk≥xt−m
exk−(xt−m)
,
where all the intermediate exponential values are limited to[
e0,em
]
, which enables us to use a small bit length to eval-
uate the secure softmax with Yao’s Garbled Circuits. For
example, for an accuracy requirement of 10−3 and the num-
ber of classes K is 100, we have m≥ ln(10−3 ∗100−100)≈
11.52, and e12 takes only 18 bits, while the original xt may
reach up to > 100 [9] and e100 takes 145 bits.
Based on the above analysis, the outline protocol of our
proposed secure softmax is as follows:
1. Let [F (x)], where x = {x1,x2, · · · ,xK}, be the input to
the softmax layer and the output of the fully connected
layer. Server S masks it with a random vector r, and
sends [F (x− r)] to client C. Then S sets its share to
xS = r= {r1,r2, · · · ,rK} mod p.
2. The client C decrypts [F (x− r)] and performs the in-
verse FFT to obtain (x− r). Then C set its share to
xC = x− r= {x1− r1,x2− r2, · · · ,xK− rK} mod p.
3. Now C and S interact with each other to find the max-
imum value xt and decide which xi can be ignored
according to the selected integer m, and set the ig-
nored one and the left xi to 0 and m− (xt − xi), re-
spectively. To be noted, the plaintext modulo is con-
verted to (m+1), and there no longer exist negative val-
ues. At the end of this procedure, C and S hold newly
generated shares, xS = {r′1,r′2, · · · ,r′K} mod (m+1) and
xC = {x′1− r′1,x′2− r′2, · · · ,x′K− r′K}mod m+1, where x′i
is 0 or m− (xt − xi) and r′i is randomly generated by S.
4. Next, to calculate the denominator of p′t , client C and
server S first calculate ex
C
= {ex′1−r′1 ,ex′2−r′2 , · · · ,ex′K−r′K}
and ex
S
= {er′1 ,er′2 , · · · ,er′K}. Then, they use Yao’s
Garbled Circuits to calculate the denominator of p′t .
The boolean circuits used here for Yao’s Garbled
Circuits can be simply implemented with ADDGate,
MULGate and MUXGate, and we ignore the details
here. The xC and xS are used to guarantee that every
e(x
′
i−r′i mod m+1)+(r′i mod m+1) does not exceed em+1 and
decide whether to drop it. The final calculation result,
i.e. the denominator of p′t , will be obtained by C.
At this point, since C owns the denominator of pt and the
numerator em is public, it is able to calculate p′t .
Security analysis. Since all the private information, i.e.
x1,x2, · · · ,xK , remains shared throughout the protocol, their
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privacy is guaranteed. Note that, the potential leakage re-
sulting from p′t is out of scope of this paper. Actually, it is
a general problem of neural networks [30]. Since the nu-
merator of p′t , i.e. em, is public and contains no information
about p′t , the possible information that could infer from the
denominator of p′t is equal to p′t .
6 Performance Evaluation
We implemented FALCON in C++. For fast Fourier Trans-
form (FFT), we used FFTW library [14]. For additively ho-
momorphic encryption, we used the Fan-Vercauteren (FV)
scheme [5]. For secure two-party computing, we used Yao’s
Garbled Circuits implemented by the ABY framework. For
performance comparison purpose, we used the same param-
eters p and q as what used in [21]. The selected parame-
ters for both schemes are 128-bit security level. Specifically,
the number of slots n, the plaintext module p, and the ci-
phertext module q are needed for the initialization of the FV
scheme. We chose n = 2048, which means we can process
up to 2048 elements in parallel, and the ciphertext module
q was set to 1152921504382476289. The plaintext mod-
ule p was set to 1316638721, which has 30-bit length and is
enough for all the intermediate values since they can be se-
curely scaled down as discussed in Section 4 and suggested
by MiniONN[23].
We tested FALCON on two computers, both of which are
equipped with Intel i5-7500 CPU with 4 3.40 GHz cores and
8GB memory, and have Ubuntu 16.04 installed. We let one
be the client C and the other play as the server S. We took
experiments in the LAN setting similar to previous work [23,
21]. Each experiment was repeated for 100 times and we
report the mean in this paper. In this section, we will first
evaluate the benchmarks for individual layers in the order
mentioned in our contributions, and then compare FALCON
with previous work on real-world models. As the authors in
GAZELLE and MiniONN haven’t released their codes, here
we use the results from their papers for comparison.
6.1 Benchmarks for Layers
Here we introduce the performance of different layers, i.e.
convolutional, fully-connected, ReLU, max pooling, and
softmax layers. Since GAZELLE is the best known one
among existing works, we only compare FALCON with it in
all layers except the softmax layer, which is not implemented
by GAZELLE. For benchmarking, all input data to each lay-
ers are randomly sampled from [0, p). For convolutional and
fully connected layers, their parameters are chosen from the
CIFAR-10 model stated in Section 6.2.
Our first contribution is accelerating convolutional and
fully-connected layers by the integrated use of FFT and
lattice-based homomorphic encryption. Thus we present the
benchmarks for convolutional and fully-connected layers in
the different input size. As shown in Table 2, for convolu-
tional layers, we show the online running time with input
(w× h× c) and filter ( fw× fh× c, k) using different frame-
works. For fully-connected layers, we report the running
time with the input vector of length li and the output vector
of length lo. Note that, the setup phases involve perform-
ing FFT on filters and encrypting random values for mask-
ing, and the online phases take only the server’s computa-
tion into account. As one can see from Table 2, FALCON
outperforms GAZELLE in both setup and online phases. Es-
pecially for online phases, our efficient Conv and FC imple-
mentations offer us over 10× less runtime.
Table 2: Benchmarks and Comparisons for Conv and FC.
Layer Input Filter/Output Framework Time (ms)setup online
Conv
Layer
(28×28×1) (5×5×1, 5) GAZELLEFALCON
11.4
3.1
9.2
0.25
(16×16×128) (3×3×128, 128) GAZELLEFALCON
3312
615
704
51.2
FC
Layer
2048 1
GAZELLE
FALCON
16.2
1.2
8.0
0.1
1024 16
GAZELLE
FALCON
21.8
9.6
7.8
0.8
In Table 3, we report the running time and communica-
tion overhead of setup and online phases for ReLU and Max
Pooling layers. Note that, since we utilize ABY to imple-
ment our scheme, these experimental results succeed its op-
timization for secure two-party computation. In addition to
the data preprocessing, the online communication overhead
of ReLU and max pooling operations is almost negligible.
We can also see that the optimized max pooling and ReLU
operations have reduced the computation and communica-
tion overhead in all phases. Therefore, in ReLU and Max-
Pooling layers, FALCON which uses the optimized version
outperforms GAZELLE which uses the original version.
Table 3: Benchmarks for ReLU and Max Pooling.
Operation Number ofInputs
Time (ms) Comm (MB)
setup online setup online
Data
Preprocessing
1000
10000
32.3
265.5
14.5
136.4
4.82
48.2
1.45
14.9
ReLU
1000
10000
9.82
96.2
4.20
43.2
1.95
19.2
0.01
0.11
MaxPooling
1000
10000
12.1
100
5.6
45.5
1.94
20.0
0.01
0.12
ReLU+MaxPooling
1000
10000
21.9
196.3
9.8
88.7
3.89
39.2
0.02
0.23
Optimized
MaxPooling+ReLU
1000
10000
12.5
134.3
5.2
54.4
2.44
24.4
0.02
0.14
We tested the performance of our proposed protocol for
softmax function in different settings. As shown in Table 4,
the runtime cost and communication overhead of setup and
online phases grow with the accuracy and the number of
classes. The runtime and communication overhead of our
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proposed softmax evaluation method is relatively small com-
pared with other layers of a CNN.
Table 4: Benchmarks for the Softmax.
Accuracy Classes Time (ms) Comm (MB)setup online setup online
10−2
10
100
1000
8.56
58.7
574.8
3.89
24.5
254.6
0.996
9.96
99.6
0.0294
0.294
29.4
10−4
10
100
1000
8.66
60.3
588.0
4.02
26.7
257.6
0.996
9.96
99.6
0.0294
0.294
29.4
6.2 Evaluations on Real-World Models
We evaluated the performance of FALCON on two real-
world models, MNIST and CIFAR-10. We show the time
cost and the communication overhead in both setup and on-
line phases. The time cost includes the computation cost of
client C and server S and the transmission latency between
them. To be noted, for the fairness of comparison, the soft-
max layer is excluded in both models.
MNIST is a dataset for handwritten digits and is widely
used for image classification and recognition tasks. We use
the CNN model for MNIST from [23]. This CNN model
takes a gray scale image with size 28×28 as input, and out-
puts the classification result, which is either 0 to 9. It has 2
convolutional, 2 fully-connected, 3 ReLU and 2 max pooling
layers.
CIFAR-10 is a small RGB image dataset in 10 classes
and is widely used for image classification tasks. We use
the CNN model for CIFAR-10 from [23]. The input to this
CIFAR-10 model is a three channel image of size 32×32×
3, and the output is the class it belongs to. This model con-
tains 7 convolutional, 1 fully-connected, 7 ReLU and 2 mean
pooling layers.
Table 5: Performance Comparison on MNIST and CIFAR-
10.
CNN Framework Time (s) Comm (MB)setup online total setup online total
MNIST
MiniONN
GAZELLE
FALCON
3.58
0.48
0.63
5.74
0.33
0.21
9.32
0.81
0.84
20.9
47.5
77.0
636.6
22.5
15.5
657.5
70.0
92.5
CIFAR-10
MiniONN
GAZELLE
FALCON
472
9.34
7.20
72
3.56
2.88
544
12.9
10.1
3046
940
1194
6226
296
265
9272
1236
1459
As shown in Table 5, when evaluating the online overhead
on MNIST model, FALCON is running over 27× faster than
MiniONN while reducing communication overhead by over
97%. For the online overhead in CIFAR-10, FALCON is
about 25× faster than MiniONN and reduce communication
overhead by over 97%. The significant improvement in run-
ning time is due to the repeatedly use of FFT and lattice-
based homomorphic encryption, which saves many multipli-
cations over ciphertexts.
When comparing with GAZELLE, FALCON also shows
improvements on online overhead. Meanwhile, FALCON
can output the probability of the top label while GAZELLE
cannot. Here we would like to make a comment about
GAZELLE. We found two versions of GAZELLE, i.e., [21]
and [20], and some experimental results in these two ver-
sions are not consistent. The online running time of ReLU
and MaxPooling in [21] is about 10× faster than that in
[20] while all algorithms and experimental settings stay no
change. Furthermore, we also found inconsistent data in
[21], the most recent version. In Table 11 of [21], the of-
fline running time of GAZELLE on network topology D is
0.481 seconds. Note that the ReLU layer of neural network D
has ≈ 10,000 outputs and the MaxPooling layer has ≈ 2560
outputs, which will cost over 0.97 seconds according to Ta-
ble 10 in [21] (much larger than the stated 0.481 seconds).
We tried to communicate with the authors to check such in-
consistency in their paper, and we did not get a reply from
the authors. A comparison with GAZELLE will be added
once their benchmark is finalized or they release the source-
code. Anyway, since FALCON has better performance in
each layer of CNN layers, we are confident that FALCON
should outperform GAZELLE on a complete CNN.
6.3 Prediction Accuracy on Real-World Mod-
els
Since we treat decimal numbers as integers by proper scal-
ing, there might have accuracy concerns on the encrypted
models. Fig. 6 shows that the loss of accuracy in FALCON
is negligible, and different schemes achieve nearly the same
results. Since GAZELLE did not report their models’ accu-
racy, we only perform the comparison with MiniONN.
Table 6: Prediction Accuracy on MNIST and CIFAR-10.
Plaintext MiniONN GAZELLE FALCON
MNIST 99.31% 99.0% - 99.26%
CIFAR-10 81.61% 81.61 % - 81.61%
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a fast and secure evaluation ap-
proach for convolutional neural networks. For linear lay-
ers including convolutional and fully-connected, our fast
Fourier Transform based scheme achieves a low latency per-
formance. For non-linear layers including ReLU and max
pooling, we provided a detailed implementation including
the usage of optimized processing pipeline. For the softmax
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layer that has not been studied in previous works, we intro-
duced the first efficient and privacy-preserving protocol for
it. Finally, our evaluation results show that FALCON has less
computation and communication overhead in each layer and
achieves best known performance thus far on CNN models.
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A Proof of Correctness
We here provide a proof for the correctness of Theorem
1. Our proof idea is to derive the range of m requiring
|pt − p′t | ≤ 10−l .
Proof. Since pt = e
xt
∑Kk=1 e
xk
≤ ext∑
xk≥xt−m
exk = p
′
t , we have
∣∣pt − p′t ∣∣≤ 10−l ⇔ p′t − pt ≤ 10−l .
If we require p′t − pt ≤ 10−l , then
ext
∑
xk≥xt−m
exk
− e
xt
∑Kk=1 exk
≤ 10−l . (8)
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Letting T0 = ext , T1 = ∑
xt−xk≤m
k 6=t
exk , and T2 = ∑
xt−xk>m
exk , we
can rewrite inequality (8) as
T0
T0+T1
− T0
T0+T1+T2
≤ 10−l , (9)
which is equivalent to
T 20 +2T0T1+T
2
1
T0T2
+
T1
T0
+1≥ 10l . (10)
If we want this inequality holds, then we require that the
minimum of the left side is greater or equal to the right side.
Since T0 is fixed, we can minimize T1 and maximize T2 to
minimize the left side of the inequality. Letting the length of
T1 and T2 be s1 and s2 respectively, we have
minimum(T1) = s1 · ext−m, maximum(T2) = s2 · ext−m.
Bringing the minimum T1 and maximum T2 to the inequality
(10), we can derive
m≥ ln(
√
[(10l−1)2 · s2−4 ·10l · s1] · s2
4
+
(10l−1) · s2−2 · s1
2
).
(11)
If we want the inequality (11) holds, m needs to be greater or
equal to the maximum of the right side. Since l≥ 1, the max-
imum value of the right side is obtained when maximizing s2
and minimizing s1. Because s1+ s2 = K−1, we have
minimum(s1) = 0, maximum(s2) = K−1.
Bringing the minimum s1 and maximum s2 to the inequality
(11), we have
m≥ ln
[
(10l−1)(K−1)
]
. (12)
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